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ARTICLES

PREDICTIONS OF DANGEROUSNESS: ETHICAL
CONCERNS AND PROPOSED LIMITS
MARC MILLER* AND NORVAL MORRIS"

The preemptive strike-capturing the criminal before
the crime-has great attraction, and efforts at such anticipatory interventions are growing throughout the criminal law.
Policies of selective law enforcement, selective prosecution,
and selective incapacitation are being developed by police,
prosecutors, legislatures and parole boards, but practice outstrips both empirical validation and theoretical justification.
Along with the obvious scientific and legal problems
raised by these preemptive strikes are substantial moral concerns: to what extent should predictions of future behavior
limit current liberty? The threat to individual autonomy
raised by the reliance on group behavior to control the individual is substantial, and possible racial, ethnic, and class bias
is more than a specter. Any suggested use of predictions must
respond to all of these concerns.
In the face of doubts about the accuracy, efficacy, and
morality of predictions of dangerousness, one suggested response has been to reject, root and branch, reliance on such
predictions as a ground for any interference with individual
liberty. But that is an impossible position to maintain. Predictions of dangerousness play an important role in decision
making throughout the criminal justice system. First, implicit
predictions of future behavior are made at every point in the
criminal justice system where physical danger to the person is
threatened. Second, explicit predictions of such behavior
have been part of the criminal law for centuries; current use
is extensive and includes prosecutorial decisions, bail and pretrial detention, and sentencing schemes at local, state, and
* Attorney-Advisor, Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice.
** Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology at the University of Chicago Law School. This article appeared in slightly different form
in 6 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1985). The National Academy of Sciences has ac-

cepted the standard developed in this article as its official position on predictions of dangerousness.
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federal levels. Wilson has noted that "[t]he entire criminal
justice system is shot through at every stage (bail, probation,
sentencing, and parole) with efforts at prediction, and necessarily so; if we did not try to predict, we would release on bail
or on probation either many more or many fewer persons,
and make some sentences either much longer or much
shorter." 1
The explicit use of predictions has been widely recognized and utilized by criminal justice authorities as well as by
the courts.' All current members of the United States Supreme Court have expressed their agreement with Justice
Stevens' statement in Jurek v. Texas that "any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's probable future
conduct when it engages in the process of determining what
punishment to impose." 3 The Court recently considered explicit use of predictions in one case involving the Texas death
penalty statute 4 and in another case involving the continued
detention of an individual who had pled not guilty by reason
of insanity after the expiration of the time for which he could
1. J. WILSON, CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 279 (1983).
2. Federal and state cases have recognized the necessity for the use
of predictions in particular situations. United States v. Glover, 725 F.2d
120 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1682 (1986) (police decision to
arrest); Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1984) (prison movement); Wyler v. United States, 725 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1983) (police search);
United States v. Cox, 719 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1714 (1986) (bail and sentencing); United States v. Davis, 710 F.2d 104,
107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001 (1983) ("district judges routinely
determine whether a defendant is dangerous for the purposes of regular
sentencing and setting bail"); Inmates of B-Block v. Jeffes, 79 Pa. Commw.
275, 470 A.2d 176 (1983), affid, 504 Pa. 509, 475 A.2d 743 (1984) (per
curiam) (prison control); Illinois v. Carmack, 103 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 432
N.E.2d 282 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 875 (1982) (police action); Gammage v. State, 630 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. App. 1982) (constitutionality of manacling defendant during trial). Predictions of dangerousness play a central
role in the Model Penal Code's (MPC's) provision on attempt, focusing on
the dangerousness of the actor and not the dangerousness of his conduct.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Official Draft 1962). The MPC's attempt provision has been adopted by some of the circuits. See, e.g., United States v.
Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114
(1975). The Harvard Dangerous Offender Project presents many examples
showing the pervasive role of predictions of dangerousness throughout the
criminal law. See M. MOORE, S. ESTRICH, D. McGILLIS & W. SPELMAN, DEALDANGEROUS OFFENDERS (1983).
ING wrrI
3. 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976).
4. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Court was faced
with the constitutionality of the Texas death penalty statute which, in effect, allows a finding of future dangerousness to justify a capital sentence.
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have been held if convicted of the crime.' Finally, predictions
of dangerousness also underlie the civil commitment of those
mentally ill or retarded persons who are thought likely to be
a danger to themselves or others.
Therefore, a jurisprudence that pretends to exclude the
role of predictions of dangerousness is self-deceptive. The
fact that such predictions are made and relied on, and cannot
be banished from the criminal law, is one reason for acknowledging them, studying them, and trying to improve their accuracy. But the justification is larger than this response to the
inevitable. We must develop a jurisprudence of predictions if
we are, with appreciation of our modest store of knowledge
of human behavior, justly to allocate the properly limited punitive powers under the criminal law. A merciful and just system of punishment presupposes leniency toward those who
least threaten social injury; and this inexorably involves predictions of dangerousness.
The proper question, therefore, is not whether predictions should be used, but where and how they should be
used. These questions have not been squarely faced by lawyers, politicians, and others concerned with the ethics of social policy. Yet determinations about the proper use of predictions are, in the end, not a statistical or scientific matter,
but a political and social judgment about what risks are unacceptable, and what responses to risks should be allowed.
Many values other than the hope of preventing future
injuries determine criminal sanctions; a theory of criminal
justice is vastly broader than a theory of crime prevention by
controlling those who threaten criminal injuries. But predictions of dangerousness are one basis on which punishment resources are in fact allocated, and if we are to be guided by
that consideration in justly differentiating among individuals,
the relevant principles for such differentiation must be enunciated. Our effort is to define the proper and modest use of a
concept necessary to the operation of the criminal law.
We propose to get the dragon out onto the plain. We do
not focus on how well dangerousness can be predicted. We
assume that present predictive capacities will prove to be the
5. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), presented the question of the constitutionality of committing on grounds of future dangerousness one who had pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to a term that
might continue beyond the possible sentence for which he could have been
held as a prisoner or for which he could have been held as a patient on
grounds applicable to civil commitment.
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best we have for several decades. Suppose that, even among
those with a high risk of committing a future crime of violence, to be sure of preventing one such crime, we would
have to detain three of those at risk. We submit that it is still
ethically appropriate and socially desirable to take such predictions into account in many police, prosecutorial, judicial,
correctional, and legislative decisions.
Lest we be mistaken for advocates of an extension of
preemptive sentencing, let us mention some of the limiting
principles we shall develop in this essay. 6 We argue that punishment should not be extended or imposed on the basis of
predictions of dangerousness beyond what would be justified
independent of that prediction. Thus the concept of "desert"7
defines the upper and lower limits of allowable punishment.
Within these limits, however, we believe that predictions of
dangerousness should influence sentencing and punishment
decisions, broadly defined, based on the balancing principles
developed in this essay. These are explicit restrictive principles. A proper role for predictive sentencing should result in
the reduction of the present, pervasive reliance on implicit
predictions, which are often based on erroneous assumptions
and expectations.
In the first part of this essay, we deal with definitions,
limit the scope of our inquiry, and suggest some present and
likely future applications of predictions of dangerousness. In
the second part, we discuss the limits of present capacities to
predict dangerousness. The third part examines common
conceptual problems regarding prediction of violent behavior, in particular issues dealing with justice to the individual.
That part also discusses risk shifting between individuals and
society, and responds to the concern about racial bias in predictions. In the fourth part, we review the development of
judicial doctrines of dangerousness and strike at what we see
as the fundamental imprecision in the present judicial consideration of this concept. The fifth part presents our general
theory of the appropriate use of predictions of
dangerousness.
6. Without limits, some possible uses of predictions of dangerousness indeed have an Alice in Wonderland quality to them-punishment first,
trial later.
7. There may be additional considerations in setting the corresponding lower limits of just punishment.
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I.

PREDICTIONS OF DANGEROUSNESS

There is nothing alien about using predictions of the future behavior of others to guide our conduct; it is hard to
imagine life without such assumptions of both the continuities and discontinuities of the behavior of others and without
reliance on such assumptions. It would certainly be difficult
to cross a city street; driving a car would be unthinkable.
In this essay, we concentrate on the use of explicit predictions of dangerousness, whether spelled out in statutes or
articulated by judges in decisions, but we stress the pervasive
importance of the implicit predictions that we are not discussing. They play a fundamental role in the operation of the
criminal law, even though they may never be articulated or
even recognized as such by those relying on them.
There is a lengthy history of reliance on explicit predictions of dangerousness, dating at least from the sixteenth
century, and of applying express predictions of dangerousness as a ground for invocation of criminal sanctions. Here is
a brief catalog:
1. With the enclosures of the commons and the Elizabethan Poor Laws came the Vagrancy Acts, providing sanctions
against sturdy rogues and vagabonds, those wandering
abroad without lawful or visible means of support, those loitering with intent, and those falling within similar arcane
phraseology which still underpins the disorderly conduct statutes, regulations, and ordinances of many states, cities, and
counties in the United States. These sanctions are plainly preemptive strikes against those seen as likely to be disturbing,
disruptive, or dangerous. Included in this group would be
"suspicious persons" ordinances, "stop and frisk," and public
drunkenness laws.
2. Habitual Offender Laws and "third-time loser" laws
all have a long and checkered history in England and this
country. Their quality of being based in part on predictions
of future criminal acts was most manifest in what was called
the "dual track" system of punishment in some European habitual-criminal statutes that had their analogues in this country. For many years, under English habitual-criminal legislation, when the habitual criminal had finished the term of
imprisonment for his last offense, he would then be held as a
habitual criminal; the conditions of his detention were ameliorated and more recreational facilities and comforts extended to him, since he was now not being "punished" but
rather detained because of his high likelihood of future
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criminality.
3. For persistent but less serious habitual offenders-unredeemable nuisances rather than serious
threats-many states devised and applied Habitual Petty Offender Laws, jurisprudentially akin to the previous category.
4. Sexual Psychopath Laws are perhaps the best known
example of sentences statutorily based on predictions of dangerousness. They disgraced our jurisprudence, grossly misapplying what little knowledge we have about the sexual offender, achieving injustice without social protection.
5. Special Dangerous Offender statutes were recommended by the American Law Institute in its Model Penal
Code' and have found diverse ways into the statute books of
most states.' Such statutes often rely expressly on the alleged
capacity of psychologists to assist juries or the sentencing
judge in predicting the greater future dangerousness of certain categories of offenders and therefore the propriety of
imposing increased sanctions on them. Federal Special Dangerous Offender statutory provisions were enacted to limit
unprincipled Sexual Psychopath statutes.1"
6. Sentencing generally: Setting aside those situations
where the legislature has provided a mandatory sentence
without allowing the sentencing judge discretion in its imposition, it is clear that predictions of dangerousness influence a
wide swath of criminal sanctions. The judge's view of the
gravity of the harm, the seriousness of the criminal's past record, and the likelihood of his future criminality has frequently been shown to be important in the determination of
the sentence imposed within the discretion statutorily available to the judge. In those many statutes that specify the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be taken into account in fixing sentences, the likely future dangerousness of
the offender is frequently expressly included in the list of aggravating factors. The specification that the offender does
not present a threat of future injury, and the approval therefore of a penalty-say probation-less severe than the imprisonment that otherwise might be ordered may itself function as a prediction of relative dangerousness to those not so
selected as "safe."
8. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07(4) (Official Draft 1962).
9. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 105-1.01 (Smith-Hurd 1980);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 975.01 (West 1985).

10.

Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. 10, 84 Stat. 948, repealed by Sentencing

Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987.
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7. Sentencing of young offenders in juvenile courts seems
even more clearly than that of adult offenders to be largely
based on predictions of their probable criminality-on the
likely pattern of their lives if they are not detained.
8. Parole is widespread. Those less likely to commit a
crime during the parole period may be released; those more
likely may be held. In the federal system and several states,
these predictions are quantified into parole prediction tables.
Many criticize this whole development, but rarely on the
ground that it is usurpation of power based on mistaken
predictions. 1
9. Recent prison crowding combined with judicial orders
limiting overcrowding have compelled the early release of
prisoners in several states before the completion of their
prison terms, less time off for good behavior. In every instance, efforts were made-and publicized-to insure that
the less dangerous were being selected for earlier release and
the more dangerous detained to complete their terms.
10. Bail practice is another excellent example of express
predictions of dangerousness. The received doctrine is that
bail is adjusted to the prediction of the accused's likelihood
of appearance for trial-not a prediction of dangerousness-but it is the common knowledge of the profession that
judges do take into account the likelihood of criminality, particularly serious criminality, prior to trial. Elsewhere, in both
common law and civil law countries, the fiction of the nonconsideration of the likely dangerousness of the offender
prior to trial has been abandoned, and there is strong pressure in this country for its attenuation and eventual abandonment, provided speedy trials can be arranged for those detained as dangerous.
11. A grim conclusion to this catalog: Recent initiatives
for the reinstatement of capital punishment have led in several states to the possibility of the application of that punishment instead of protracted imprisonment because, as the
Texas Criminal Code, for example, states, "there is a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society. '"12

Recently, the stakes of these types of predictions have
been raised in the criminal law, with career criminal projects
being applied at the police and prosecutorial levels and poli11.
12.

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1982).
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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cies of selective incapacitation at the sentencing level under
the apparent belief that legislators, police, prosecutors,
judges, and juries are able to select the most dangerous
criminals for swifter and more determined prosecution and
for more protracted incarceration.' In what may become a
model for the states, Congress, in 1984, supported the use of
predictions of dangerousness
in pretrial detention and sen4
tencing decisions.1
Though in this essay we focus on problems in the application of the criminal law, parallel developments in the law
relating to the civil commitment of the mentally ill merit
mention. The law has shifted steadily over the past twenty
years toward reliance on predictions of dangerousness to the
patient or to others, as well as on a person's mental illness or
retardation, as preconditions to civil commitment. Efforts to
improve the validity of these predictions by requiring proof
of an overt act of injury or threatened injury have been litigated,1 5 the argument reaching constitutional proportions,
and, as we shall later discuss, a great deal of judicial attention
has been devoted to the standard of proof of dangerousness
necessary for such a commitment.
One point of importance to criminal law predictions of
13. James Q. Wilson summarizes the thrust of these programs as
follows:
Prosecutors would screen all arrested persons ... and give priority ... to those who, whatever their crime, were predicted to be
high-rate offenders ....
If found guilty, the offender's sentence
would be shaped . . . by an informed judgment as to whether he
committed crimes at a high or low rate when free on the street
....
Scarce prison space would be conserved by keeping the
terms of low-rate offenders very short and by reserving the longer
terms for the minority of "violent predators."
J. WILSON, supra note 1, at 286-87.
14. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, 98 Stat. 1837; 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(b) (West 1985) (pretrial detention) ("The judicial officer shall order the pretrial release of the person in
his recognizance . . . unless the judicial officer determines that such release will . . . endanger the safety of any other person or the community."); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (sentencing) ("The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider-the need for the
sentence imposed to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant ....
).
15. Here is another dragon that needs to be brought out on the
plain: the misuse of alleged predictions of dangerousness to conceal commitments under the civil law based in fact on the person's need for treatment or on a substituted or proxy judgment of what is good for him. See
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on separate
grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
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dangerousness arises from the burgeoning experience with
these predictions as a basis for civil commitment. Short-term
predictions, made in times of impending crisis and limited in
effect, prove to have much higher levels of reliability than
longer-term predictions that the patient, if released, will be a
danger to himself or others.
The necessity of acting upon short-term predictions of
harm, for example the threats of an angry husband in a domestic relations dispute or the threat of suicide by one severely depressed, seems obvious. While ready acceptance of
the use of predictions of dangerousness in such situations
supports our general point that predictions of dangerousness
are a necessary factor in regulating the relationship between
individual and state, we are more concerned with the moral
problems raised by the use of long-term predictions of violent
behavior-predictions covering months and years, not hours
and days. 16
In the discussion so far, "dangerousness" itself has been
left vague and undefined. But if we are considering predictions, we must seek agreement, if not precision, on the meaning of "dangerousness." The key elements in defining the
16. The distinct issues raised by the use of short-term predictions of
dangerousness appear in the recent Supreme Court decision in Schall v.
Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984). In Martin, the Court upheld a New York
statute that allowed pretrial detention of juveniles accused of delinquency
if there was "serious risk" that the juvenile would commit another delinquent act during the.time before trial. The statute was attacked as fatally
vague because "it is virtually impossible to predict future criminal conduct
with any accuracy." Id. at 2417. The majority responded by noting that
"from a legal point of view there is nothing inherently unattainable about
a prediction of future criminal conduct." Id. The majority realized that
"[s]uch a judgment forms an important element in many decisions, and we
have specifically rejected the contention . . . that it is impossible to predict
future behavior and that the question is so vague as to be meaningless." Id.
at 2418 (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976)). In Martin, "the
detention [was] strictly limited in time." 104 S. Ct. at 2413. The maximum
detention was seventeen days for juveniles accused of a serious crime and
six days for those accused of a major crime. Martin also involved the sui
generis element of the state's parens patriaeinterest in the juvenile, and the
majority seemed to turn the decision on the belief that juveniles "are always in some form of custody." Id. at 2410. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
17 (1966). The majority also failed to distinguish different types of predictions of future criminal behavior, assuming the prediction under the New
York statute to be based on a "host" of variables "which cannot be readily
codified." 104 S. Ct. at 2418. The use of predictions of future behavior
does not require unbounded discretion on the part of the decision maker,
and all predictions of dangerous or criminal behavior are not as uneasily
based as the Court seems to imply.
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term are the type and magnitude of harm predicted and the
level of risk (the rate) of that harm; the product .of these variables being a measure of total harm that at some point many
in our society would agree constitutes dangerousness. The
level at which society determines which risks are unacceptable, and the actions justified by such a determination, are
suggested later in this essay.
Defining dangerousness for the purposes of our inquiry
involves more than simply assessing the risk of injury involved in a given situation. With equanimity-at least without the same sort of fear that is inspired by criminal violence-we all accept more substantial risks of injury than
those that flow from criminals. The hazards of industrial accidents, of fire, and of movement in traffic inflict far more
physical injury than does violent crime. Yet these are not the
types of injury anyone would include for analysis in this essay.
The risk from the car is high, the risk from the knife is low;
yet we fear the latter more than the former as we move out
of doors at night.
Hence, we confine "dangerousness" in this essay to intentional behavior that is physically dangerousness to the person or threatens a person or persons other than the perpetrator-in effect, to assaultive criminality. We do not mean to
depreciate the significance of the threats to social welfare of
predatory theft and many other types of crime."' And generally, we are thinking of graver types of assaultive criminality,
since it is our view that serious physical injury to the person
or the threat of such injury is what emotionally fuels the
whole movement toward the use of predictions of dangerousness in the criminal law, and that it is therefore appropriate
to develop our thesis around those harms.18 A tough case for
exclusion is home burglary, since it is an offense that sometimes involves injury to the person or the threat of such in17. We also exclude considerations of self-injury as a ground for
civil commitment of the mentally ill; the danger to others from a patient,
as distinct from the danger to the patient, providing the analogy to the
criminal's threat to the physical safety of others. It should be noted that
predictions of suicidal attempts can, for some disturbed persons, be made
with higher likelihoods than any predictions of violence to others; similarly, predictions of predatory theft can often be made with higher likelihoods than can predictions of physical violence.
18. Though it is a question left for other authors whether predictions of lesser harms at a higher rate might similarly justify the preemptive
strike as do larger harms at a lower rate, we suggest that there may well be
additional limiting considerations.
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jury and generally creates fear of such injury. In sum, we are
considering the prediction of what would colloquially be
called the behavior of "a violent criminal."
The psychological reality involved in this narrowing of
the definition of dangerousness to the behavior of the assaultive criminal is that harms intentionally inflicted on the person
generate higher levels of fear than injuries accidentally
caused to the person or intentionally caused to property.1" Be
that as it may, this essay is confined to the prediction of violent criminality, though it is hoped that the analysis may be
applicable to other harms.
II.

EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

Psychologists and psychiatrists have long considered the
predictability of "dangerousness," 2 0° but only recently have
scholars outside those fields explored the limits and uses of
predictions of dangerousness. Criminologists interested in parole prediction have also been considering these questions for
more than two decades, but legal commentators seem to have
avoided, until recently, the difficult jurisprudential issues involved in taking power over an individual based on his dangerousness. Assumptions about the legal relevance of such
predictions often turned on perceptions of the accuracy of
prediction. The assumption was that until psychologists could
predict with a fifty percent base expectancy rate of serious
violence or of a threat of violence to the person over some
relevant time period that the member of the high-risk group
is at large, there was nothing for the lawyer to discuss. 1
19.

William Lowrance lists an array of considerations influencing

safety judgments. W.

LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE

RIsK:

SCIENCE AND THE DE-

87-94 (1976). Lowrance's discussion is in the context of dangerous products but the considerations are identical. The extreme fear and dread of assaultive criminality follow from a number of
these: such violence is a risk borne involuntarily; the effect is immediate;
the risk is unknown to people operating in society; the risk is encountered
"nonoccupationally" (in the sense that people rarely choose to live in high
crime areas and because we set aside intimate violence); the hazards are
"dread"; the harms affect virtually everybody; and the consequences are
often irreversible (i.e., the harms are often very severe).
TERMINATION OF SAFETY

20.

See

J. FLOUD

& W. YOUNG, DANGEROUSNESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

(1981); J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 12434 (1981).
21. This assumption arises from confusion between the minimal
standard of proof generally required to find a fact to a legally persuasive
degree, and the level of prediction necessary to justify the use of predictions of dangerousness. This error is extensively discussed in Section IV
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By conceiving of predictions of dangerousness as "the
province of psychiatry,"2 2 lawyers foreclosed appropriate jurisprudential consideration of the use of predictions. Recently, the tables have turned: the psychiatric literature and
the official statements of the organized profession of psychiatry, paradoxically, stress the unreliability of psychiatric predictions2 while the courts increasingly rely on predictions by
individual psychiatrists and psychologists. Courts and the psychological professionals each affirm the prediction of dangerousness to be the province of the other. The courts, including the Supreme Court in Jones and Barefoot, thus allow much
greater reliance to be placed on psychological predictions of
dangerousness than do the organized professions of psychiatry and psychology.
It is important to determine which types of predictions
are appropriate to use. This involves two inquiries. The present discussion will consider practical problems with the various types of predictions and, in particular, the problem with
clinical assessments of future dangerousness when used to extend sentences. We later briefly discuss which aspects of a
person's life are socially or legally unacceptable as factors in
prediction, the paradigm problem being constitutional and
moral questions about the use of race as a variable in
prediction.
Classifications are often arbitrary, and the classification
that follows is not necessarily compelling. Nevertheless, we
see three basic paths to the prediction of future behavior.
First, the anamnestic prediction: This is how he behaved
in the past when circumstances were similar. The assumption
is that it is likely that he will behave in the same way now.
Second, the actuarialprediction: This is how people like
him, situated as he is, behaved in the past. The assumption is
that it is likely that he will behave as they did. Actuarial prebelow. Base expectancy rates are the background rate-the expected
rate-at which a given event occurs across a population. A 50% (or one in
two) expectancy rate would mean that of a given group of 100 individuals,
50 would be expected to act in accordance with the prediction.
22. "The idea is deeply rooted that identifying 'dangerous' persons
for legal purposes is a matter of diagnosing pathological attributes of character and this is nowadays thought to be the province of psychiatry; 'dangerousness' is presumed to be something for students of abnormal psychology, even when it is not clearly associated with mental illness." J. FLOUD &
W. YOUNG, supra note 20, at 22.

23. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
SANITY DEFENSE (1982).

STATEMENT

ON

THE IN-
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diction is the basis of all insurance and of a great many of our
efforts to share and shift risk in the community.
Third, the clinical prediction, which is harder to state:
"From my experience of the world, from my professional
training, from what I know about mental illness and mental
health, from my observations of this patient and efforts to
diagnose him, I think he will behave in the following fashion
in the future." Clinical prediction has elements of the first
two, but it includes professional judgments that the psychological literature treats as distinct from the others."
Anamnestic and actuarial predictions are linear in the
sense that historical facts to justify the prediction can be produced and adduced, weighed and weighted. Clinical predictions are not like that. They are immune from evidentiary
examination except in relation to the reputation, experience,
and past success or failure of the predictor. Floud and Young
rightly refer to "the art of making clinical (individualized) assessments of 'dangerousness.' ""s

Actuarial predictions are often reliable. Anamnestic predictions also are often very reliable. Indeed, they reach the
highest levels of validity. Consider the following:
24. Of course, predictions, especially clinical predictions, tend to be
blended from different sources and elements. And if an actuarial prediction has a clinical element, it falls prey, in part, to the more general criticism of clinical predictions. Our model for actuarial prediction presumes
elements that do not require clinical identification. Thus the categorization-the identification of an individual as a member of an actuarially de-

fined group-would not require the expertise of psychologists or psychia-

trists. The use of such professions to provide information otherwise
obtainable about the subject might well be found inadmissible in the

judge's discretion because of overpersuasiveness. Perhaps there is a fourth
category encompassing predictions based on the expressed intentions of
the potential actor, which we might call promissory predictions, whose impact will vary with their content and with their relationship to other anamnestic and actuarial predictors. When such predictions take the form of
threats, they themselves constitute a ground for preemptive intervention.
25. J. FLOUD & W. YOUNG, supra note 20, at 29 (emphasis added).
The psychologist or psychiatrist may present evidence underlying a clinical
judgment: this just moves the prediction to one of the testable and therefore acceptable categories. It is not predictions made by psychiatrists or
psychologists that we oppose; it is predictions made by such people on an
intuitive, untested, and unverifiable basis. If such a professional made a
prediction based on validated actuarial evidence, it would be acceptable evidence within our principles. Further, it is worth emphasizing that our
skepticism about clinical predictions of dangerousness, in which we find
support from the organized profession of psychiatry, does not in any way
reflect an underlying skepticism about the great value and importance of
psychiatrists and psychologists in many areas.
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He has taken out the old raincoat and exposed his rampant self to the young girls in the park every Friday for the
past year. Here he is, this Friday, wearing his raincoat

though the weather be fine and he is heading again for the
park.
Who says a prediction of only one in three is all you can
make in such a situation? Of course, you can make a higher
prediction. The fact that you can make a higher prediction in
this situation does not controvert what we said earlier; it is a
short-term prediction and it does not concern a crime of
violence.
Clinical predictions are of a different order. They are
more intuitive than testable, except in the result. It seems
that the best predictions of human behavior would be based
on a combination of all three types of prediction. Such an
ideal prediction would observe the pattern of behavior of the
person under consideration, would be advised by how others
like him behaved in the past, and would also be guided by a
total clinical consideration of his case, which would improve
on the prediction from the first two categories by taking into
account his distinctiveness. It would individualize the prediction to his particular circumstances. Regrettably, this is not
workable for the prediction of violent behavior at the present
level of our knowledge. Floud and Young, like Monahan,
conclude that "[p]sychological theory is not as effective as statistical theory in selecting what is relevant and important.""
There have been no demonstrations and no claims to demonstrate that the addition of a clinical element in predictions
can improve upon actuarial and anamnestic predictions.2 7
This is not to argue that reliance should never be placed
on expert clinical or even intuitive lay predictions of violence.
In emergency situations, such as the short-term commitment
of a mentally ill husband threatening injury to his wife, there
is little choice. But where a longer and more significant deprivation of liberty, such as extended incarceration, may result
from the determination of dangerousness, clinical predictions
must find their validity and reliability in data concerning the
nearest like group.
It is important to take stock of current predictive capacities. With our present knowledge, with the best possible long26.
27.

AN

Id. at 27.
See D. FARRINGTON & R.
INTRODUCTION (1983).
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term predictions of violent behavior, we can expect to make
one true positive prediction of violence to the person for
every two false positive predictions.2 The body of research
supporting this modest conclusion is not extensive, but there
are no acceptable studies reaching a contrary result."9 We
know of only eight serious prospective studies.3 0 Retrospective studies are a different matter-they'are only the first
steps on which predictions might be built.
The assumption that three individuals must be controlled
if the violent crime of one (no one knowing which one) is to
be prevented is important and necessary to our thesis, since it
28. Among the most obvious problems with such statistics in predicting a rare event such as severely violent conduct is that researchers may
not be aware of some violent occurrences, and thus the predictions may be
understated. To the extent that this is true, any reliance on the lower
known figure is not made less acceptable. Two points should be made: first,
the "dark figures" for crimes of violence against the person are lower than
for crimes against property or for an amorphous notion of general "recidivism;" and second, prospective studies which follow a group of individuals
will be particularly sensitive to events which might not otherwise be noted
by the criminal justice system. We reject the use of any assumptions made
about unreported crime to boost reliance upon predictions.
29. Two recent books survey and summarize what is now known
about the prediction of dangerousness. See J. MONAHAN, supra note 20 (focusing on the state of the art in predicting violence); J. FLOUD & W. YOUNG,
supra note 20 (considering the use of explicit predictions of dangerousness
for "protective sentencing"--the lengthening of sentences for offenders
identified as "dangerous"-and examining questions of how and when predictions of dangerousness can justly be used in the criminal law). In other
papers, Monahan offers his view on the appropriate application of such
predictions in the criminal law; Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior:
Toward a Second Generation of Theory and Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10
(1984); Monahan, The Casefor Predictionin the Modified Desert Model of Criminal Sentencing, 5 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 103 (1982); Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: A Methodological Critique and Prospectus, in DETERRENCE

AND

INCAPACITATION:

ESTIMATING

THE

EFFECTS

OF

CRIMINAL

SANCTIONS ON CRIME ROLES 244 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds.
1978) [hereinafter cited as Methodological Critique]. In this essay, we rely on
Floud and Young and on J. MONAHAN, supra note 20, for the empirical
assessments of predictive capacities relevant to our analysis, and we have
been greatly assisted by their reflections on the jurisprudential issues.
Floud and Young have generated extensive debate among English criminologists. See Dangerousness and Criminal Justice: A Collection of Papers, 22
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 213 (1982). See also PredictingDangerousness, J. CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS, Winter-Spring 1983, at 3. Excellent and reasonably current
bibliographies of the relevant literature concerning both the empirical and
the jurisprudential aspects of dangerousness are supplied by J. FLouD & W.
YOUNG, supra note 20, at 203-15, and J. MONAHAN, supra note 20, at 12434.
30. Excellently summarized in Methological Critique, supra note 29.
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forces us to confront issues that our current verbal manipulations of imprecise burdens of proof and of unquantified articulations of risk allow us to finesse. And when that confrontation occurs, the problem shifts from one of language and
statutory interpretation to one of morality-of the proper
balance between state authority and personal autonomy. The
assumption on which we will present our theory of the
proper use of long-term predictions is that no research on
this topic, in this country or in Western Europe, claims a capacity to select a group of persons, no matter what their
criminal records, who have a fifty percent base expectancy
rate of serious violence or of a threat of violence to the person over the next five years they are at large. The Supreme
Court in Barefoot, both the majority and the minority, accepted that proposition. "[T]he 'best' clinical research currently in existence indicates that psychiatrists and psychologists
are accurate in no more than one out of three predictions of violent
behavior over a several-year period among institutionalized populations that had both committed violence in the past. . . and who
were diagnosed as mentally ill.", 1

It is partly because predictive capacity is at this level that
the entire area has been neglected by legal commentators.
There is a tendency to dismiss it as so low, so unreliable, as
not to merit consideration. But that is a serious error. Given
the relative rarity of the event to be predicted-violent criminality-a base expectancy rate of one in three is not a low
rate of prediction: it is a very high rate of prediction. The
relationships among personal characteristics and social circumstances-among character, personality, and chance-are
obviously of extreme complexity and thus most difficult to
predict; but a group of three people, one of whom within a
few months will commit a crime of extreme personal violence, is a very dangerous group indeed.
It should be recognized that these studies analyzing the
limits of our predictive capacities leave out of account a few
very rare individuals so disturbed and dangerous that no one
considers them likely candidates for freedom. There are exceptional, gravely psychotic, extremely and repetitively violent persons whose likely future criminality does not merit
study since it is so obvious. 2 And, of course, there are ex31.

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 900 n.7 (1983) (citing J.
supra note 20, at 47-49).
32. There is, of course, the question how proof would be taken
about such exceptional individuals. Usually their records will foreclose the
MONAHAN,
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treme cases of repetitive murder where the ordinary
processes of the criminal law preclude consideration of the
offender's future dangerousness. There is no need to make
statistical predictions about such individuals. Their patterns
of behavior-on which a clear anamnestic prediction could
be made-remove any need or use for more subtle statistical
identification. These extreme cases throw no light on the reality of the problem we confront, which is the propriety of
restricting the freedom of those who are not such clear cases
and yet have characteristics, histories, and social circumstances that indicate their high levels of dangerousness.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the choice facing
the criminal justice system is not whether explicit, statistical
predictions of dangerousness should be used at all; rather,
the choice is between using explicit predictions; whether statistical, clinical, or intuitive, and using implicit, intuitive predictions. Proposals must be considered against the backdrop
of the actual world of inaccurate intuitive predictions, not
compared with an ideal world of perfect knowledge and exact
predictions against which any proposal will seem inadequate.
By viewing the problem as a choice between statistical
predictions and implicit predictions, judges and legislatures
can squarely face the ethical and practical problems raised by
the use of explicit predictions of dangerousness in the criminal justice system. Furthermore, we reject abstract and unfocused discussion about the use of statistical predictions in
the criminal law; sensible debate can only occur in the context of specific proposed uses of predictions.
lurking difficulties in this question. In a letter commenting on an earlier
draft of this essay, Monahan provided a pungent story to explicate this
point. He wrote of speaking to a federal judicial sentencing conference:
I gave my stock speech about the probability of violence never being higher than 1-in-3 in the research. A judge raised his hand
and said that he recently had a case of a murderer with a large
number of prior violent offenses who, when asked if he had anything to say before sentence was imposed, stated: "if I get out, the
first thing I am going to do is murder the prosecutor, the second
thing I am going to do is murder you, Your Honor, the third
thing I am going to do is murder every witness who testified
against me and the fourth thing I am going to do is murder each
member of the jury." The judge asked if I thought that this person's probability of violence was no greater than 1-in-3. I called
for a coffee break.
Letter from John Monahan to Norval Morris, February 27, 1984.
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PREDICTION AND RISK SHIFTING

Individual Justice Concerns

It is widely recognized that "statistical predictions are
made for groups and not for individuals;" 3 yet, as Floud and
Young observed, critics of the use of predictions often make
the "mistake . . . of identifying statistical entities . . . with
particular, misjudged individuals."" A statistical prediction
of dangerousness, based on membership in a group for which
a consistent and tested pattern of conduct has been shown, is
the statement of a condition (membership in a defined group
with possession of certain attributes) and not the prediction
of a result (of future violent acts in each individual case). This
is not reflected in the language of "false positives" and "false
negatives," which imply the total absence of the predicted
condition: here, dangerousness. 5 Floud and Young point out
that "[e]rrors of prediction do not represent determinable individuals . . . . But the fact that if we were to set them at liberty,
only half of those we are at any time detaining as dangerous would
do further serious harm,
does not mean that the other half are all
36
in this sense innocent." s
33. D. FARRINGTON & R. TARLING, supra note 27, at 20.
34. J. FLOUD & W. YOUNG, supra note 20, at 21.
35. Positive predictions which come true are known as "true positives." Positive predictions which do not come true are known as "false
positives." Similarly, predictions that an event will not occur which are correct are known as true negatives, while negative predictions which do occur are false negatives. The follwing chart illustrates the four possible outcomes of predictions:
Actual Behavior
Does Occur
Does Not Occur
Predicted
Behavior
Will
True
False
Occur
Positive
Positive

Will Not
Occur

False
Negative

True
Negative

36. J. FLOUD & W. YOUNG, supra note 20, at 48 (emphasis added).
The theoretical model of the behavior being predicted has a critical impact
on the meaning of the terms "false positive" and "true positive." As a simple, initial question, it matters whether the predicted event exists in only
two states-pregnant or not pregnant-as contrasted with a degree of dangerousness. If the latter is the case, then any two state model imposed on a
continuum ("dangerous" or "not dangerous") must be arbitrary and will
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The epistemology of prediction provides no grounds for
predictions of individual behavior; it refers by nature to predictions of the behavior of defined groups of individuals. The
individual in question always belongs, by virtue of certain
stated and previously tested characteristics and circumstances, to a group with a given likelihood of specified behavior, here of violent criminality. It is the justice of applying to
each individual powers influenced by his membership in that
group that is at issue.
Analogies to dangerous objects rather than to dangerous
persons may help clarify these points. If the event or result
being predicted were fixed a priori, and the result did not involve an interaction between the object and circumstance,
then given a prediction of dangerousness, false positives
could correctly be viewed ex post as never having been dangerous in fact (even if, by definition, they were not so identified originally).
In contrast-and we will give this example some historical perspective to make it easier to appreciate-think of the
postwar days in London. For some time after the war, unexploded bombs would be found and would have to be moved
and rendered safe. Death and severe injuries were very rare;
the base expectancy rate was very low; there were large numbers of "false positives" for every "true positive"-bombs
that did not go off, as distinguished from those that did. Yet,
assuming that all or virtually all of the bombs did have the
potential to detonate, no one would say that because it proved
to be a "false positive" it was not dangerous. That is not how
words are used when the focus is dangerous objects as distinct from dangerous people, yet where the eventuality of the
predicted event is a product of a range of characteristics inherent in the object and chance, the similarities of risk and
analysis are great. Floud and Young refer to this as "the dynamic interaction of [the individual's] character and
circumstance.' '87
force the person defining the point at which the two states change to recognize some justification for choosing that line. The difference between,
e.g., predicting recidivism and predicting dangerousness is that, given a
precise definition of recidivism, a person either will or will not have committed an offense at a particular point in time. Recidivism is an event; dangerousness is a condition-a "probabilistic condition."
37. Id. at 57. Floud and Young think that the element of chance
"must be very large" even when there is an optimal prediction of an individual's character. Id. Perhaps the randomness, the element of circumstance and chance, is as large as two in three for certain types of extreme
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We do not mean to suggest that all members of a group
predicted to be dangerous are necessarily violent by nature.
It is not necessarily true that each member of a group predicted to be highly dangerous will be dangerous even in some
small degree: some eternally docile individual with bad luck
might fulfill all of the requirements of membership in a particular high-risk group; there really is a "road to Damascus"
(i.e., some people actually change their lives or have them
changed by a religious or other profound experience), and
people do grow older and burn out. We believe the distribution of violent tendencies within groups predicted to be
highly dangerous will be narrow, yet we must, of course, recognize that some of the individuals so predicted may not have
much potential for violence. Yet our justification for using
predictions of dangerousness in the criminal law does not rely
solely on our conception of human nature.
Conversely, of course, some people are dangerous
though not predicted to be dangerous (the social scientist's
"false negative"); the likelihood of potential violence is distributed within the group predicted not to be dangerous in
the same sense that it is distributed in the group predicted to
be dangerous. The prediction of dangerousness is usually an
all-or-nothing, two-state prediction, but dangerousness itself
is distributed over a range of levels even within a fairly narrowly-defined group. The tension and problems arising from
"two-state" artificial modeling must be recognized.
The conceptual difficulty in viewing a prediction of dangerousness as the identification of membership in a group
with a certain likelihood of harm stems, in part, from the language of prediction, and especially the language of true and
false positives, which seems to point to the outcome in each
individual case. Considering the use of the terms "prediction" and "dangerousness," Monahan observes that dangerous behavior "may be thought of as a prediction itself." It
might be preferable, as Monahan suggests, to refer not to
predictions '8 of "dangerous behavior" but to predictions of
"violence."
We suggest that the same clarity would come
out of focusing on the identification of individuals as members of groups which exhibit high levels of violence rather
than on predictions of individual dangerousness. Similar precision would come from referring to the "assessment" or
"evaluation" of the potential for violence; yet the language
and rare behavior.
38. J. MONAHAN, supra note 20, at 5.
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of predictions of dangerousness is so entrenched in the writings of courts and scholars that we do not seriously propose a
change in usage. We seek only conceptual clarity.
Concern about requiring the innocent to pay for the violent 39 -viewing the false positives as people who were, a priori, not dangerous but who must pay for the individuals who
become true positives and hence were, a priori, the only
"dangerous" members of the group-arises as an analogy to
the principle of the criminal trial: that it is better that nine
guilty men be acquitted than one innocent man be found
guilty. This line of reasoning, though it has persuaded many
commentators and some judges, is deeply flawed.
If one truly read a statistical prediction of one in three to
mean that one person was "bad" or "guilty" and the other
two "innocent" or "harmless," then under no circumstances
would statistical predictions of dangerousness be acceptable
grounds on which to restrict any person's liberty. The analogy to the criminal trial would hold true, and even if we
could predict nine in ten, we would not be justified in detaining the tenth, "innocent" member of the group. And, of
course, we could never civilly commit anyone, except for very
short periods, as there would be no justification for detention
under present theory. It seems odd that we are more willing
to use predictions of dangerousness to detain those whom we
think of as less culpable for their acts.
This same challenge to the use of predictions of dangerousness can be stated in terms of legal doctrine forbidding
punishment for "status" offenses.4 0 This is no different than
arguing that uses of such predictions are unjust because a
person is allegedly "punished, not for what he has done, but
for what it is believed he may do in the future."4' 1 These
claims have some merit where predictions would be used to
justify punishment beyond what would be justified in the absence of the prediction, and we oppose such uses in part on
39. Innocence here meaning only a false positive. See the discussion
at Section IV below, of the evidentiary considerations surrounding Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
40. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
41. SWEDISH NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR CRIME PREVENTION, A NEW PENAL SYSTEM (1978); Von Hirsch & Gottfredson, Selective Incapacitation:Some
Queries about Research Designs and Equity, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
11 (1983). This argument often assumes that retribution is the only justifiable aim of a sentence. See Walker, Unscientific, Unwise, Unprofitable or Unjust?, 22 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 276 (1982) (attacking this assumption).

JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 2

this ground."' Where predictions are denied an extraordinary
force in justifying a deprivation of liberty, the predictions
serve not to justify punishment, but to distribute punishments
otherwise justified and the "status" offense concern is fully
answered. 3
A prediction of dangerousness, then, is a statement of a
present condition, not the prediction of a particular result;
and further, within our limiting principles, we must act on
the condition independently of the result. The belief that it is
the prediction of a result is an error that is constantly made
and leads many astray. In sum, that the person predicted as
dangerous does no future injury does not mean that the classification was erroneous, even though the prediction itself
was wrong.
A prediction of the likelihood of harm does not and cannot in itself explain how such predictions should be used in
the criminal law. The just application of predictions of dangerousness involves a societal determination of what levels of
risk and harm are unacceptable. In looking at any risk imposed on society, there is the question of who should bear
that risk. In the case of the risks and harms imposed by the
use of certain pesticides and fertilizers, a social determination
must be made of who will bear the risk: consumers (through
the harms caused by the chemical), farmers (through reduced
productivity if these substances are banned), taxpayers
(through the government), or industry. In the case of the
danger from violent criminals, the determination that must
be made is whether society or members of the group predicted to be violent should bear the costs of their threat. 4
42. We distinguish between "customary"
uses of predictions-within punishment otherwise justified-and unacceptable extraordinary uses of predictions. See Miller, Legal and Ethical Limits on the Use of
Predictionsof Dangerousnessin the CriminalLaw, in THE PREDICTION OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE (F. Dutile & C. Foust eds. 1986).
43. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
44. Floud and Young, in the context of justifying extended
sentences for offenders predicted as dangerous, note that the analogy to
the criminal trial
misrepresents the moral choice that has to be made in considering
whether protective measures may be justly imposed. The question
is not "how many innocent persons are to sacrifice their liberty for
the extra protection that special sentences for dangerous offenders
will provide?" but "what is the moral choice between the alternative risks: the risk of harm to potential victims or the risk of unnecessarily detaining offenders judged to be dangerous . .. ."
The problem is to make a just redistribution of risk in circum-
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The societal decision, the moral decision, is not whether
to place the burden of avoiding the risk on false positives, but
how to balance the risk of harm to society and the certain
intrusion on the liberty of each member of the preventively
detained group. At some level of predicted harm from the
group, the intrusions on each individual's liberty may be justified. Thus, again in the context of extending sentences, the
goal is "a just redistribution of certain risks of grave harm:
the grave harm that potentially recidivist offenders may do to
their unknown victims and the grave harm which is suffered
by offenders if they are subjected to the hardship of preventive measures which risk being unnecessary because they depend on predictive judgments of their conduct which are inherently uncertain."'4 5 This assumption presupposes that the
risk can be quantified as a base expectancy rate and the harm
defined with some precision and, further, that it can be substantially shifted from the community, the cost of the shift
being paid by the individual by his being controlled in one or
another fashion, usually by detaining him in custody.
Let us assume a properly convicted -criminal, criminal X,
with a one-in-three base expectancy rate of violence (as we
have defined it), and another criminal, criminal Y, also properly convicted of the identical offense, but with a very much
lower base expectancy rate-same record, same offense. Unlike X, Y was not a school dropout, and he has a job to which
he may return and a supportive family who will take him
back if he is not imprisoned, or after his release from prison.
May criminal X be sent to prison while criminal Y is not? Or
may criminal X be sent to prison for a longer term than criminal Y, despite the same record and the same gravity of offense, the longer sentence being justified by the utilitarian
advantages of selective incapacitation? Our answer to both
questions is that he may.
To justify protective sentencing, the level of prediction
must be high and the threatened harm severe, whereas a
much lower level of risk may properly be relied on to justify a
lesser deprivation of liberty. It is sometimes suggested that it
is improper to restrict liberty at all on weak predictions of
future harm. Confining ourselves to predictions of future violence to the person, we shall suggest situations in which it
would be entirely proper to exercise state power to restrict
stances that do not permit of its being reduced.
J. FLOUD & W. YOUNG, supra note 20, at 49.
45. Id. at xvii.
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individual autonomy on the basis of such a prediction. A
somewhat frivolous example may make the point. At the
1983 annual meeting of the National Rifle Association
(NRA), when President Reagan undertook the heavy burden
of persuading the NRA membership of the virtues of the
handgun, all those attending had to pass through metal detectors as they entered the auditorium to insure that they
were not entering the President's presence in their usual
heavily armed condition. The authorities responsible for the
President's security had properly formed the view that the
audience presented a higher base expectancy rate of an assassination attempt than another audience of similar size-since
not all the President's audiences are so tested (though it
would not matter to the thrust of this example if they were).
We do not know the base expectancy rate of an assassination
attempt; let us guess at one in a hundred million. Is it reasonable to impose the obligation of passing through a metal detector on the basis of such a low prediction? Of course it is.
Similarly, if someone about to board an airplane matches
the risk profile for a hijacker, it is probably an appropriate
interference with that person's freedom to ask him to step
aside and answer a few questions and, if some ground warrants it, to search him." Always, the base expectancy
rate-the relationship between the true positive predictions
(e.g., one in a hundred million) and false positive predictions-must be balanced by two further considerations: How
serious is the interference with liberty involved in preventing
the possibility of that prediction coming true, and how serious is the injury if it does come true?
Take the NRA convention case another step. Should
anyone with a past record of threatening the President be excluded from the auditorium? A very slight risk of a most serious injury without any grave interference with the rights of
the person affected is a justification in our view for invocation of state authority. So dangerousness should be balanced
in relation to the extent of the harm risked, the likelihood of
its occurrence, and the extent of individual autonomy to be
invaded to avoid the harm. It is important to recognize that
determinations of what levels of risk and harm are unacceptable are inherently policy determinations. Defining unacceptable levels of dangerousness thus emerges as a social and po46. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)
(discussing the ethics of hijacker screening and upholding the constitutionality of such a system).
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litical, rather than an empirical, task. 47
The distinction between the determination of risk and
harm and the political decision as to when the risk and harm
are unacceptable and justify certain action-is made clear in
the parallel context of societal hazards brilliantly discussed by
Lowrance. 48 After outlining the measurement of risk from
various objects and activities, Lowrance notes that he has
avoided the term "measuring safety," because safety is not
measured but determined by weighing social values.49 In
Lowrance's definition, "a thing is safe if its attendant risks
are judged to be acceptable." 50 While Lowrance does not include the risk of harm from human beings, the parallels with
our discussion are clear. Measuring the probability and severity of harm from a group "is an empirical, scientific activity." ' 5 1 Determining dangerousness- "judging the
'
[un]acceptability of risks-is a normative, political activity."' 5
Isolating this element of balance, and the corresponding
social determination inherent in any use of predictions of
dangerousness in criminal law, makes it clear that decisions
about the use of dangerousness are relativistic and judgmental, not absolute. The relative nature of predictions can be
clarified in a rhetorical fashion by noting that a law that extended the term of any felon "found to be twenty times as
likely to be violent over the course of the next five years as
the average criminal," however unjust, would not seem unacceptable or illogical on its face, even if the base expectancy
rate of violence for the felons identified as "twenty times
more dangerous" were at a predicted level of one in three, a
level many deem absolutely unacceptable.
That predictions are most valuable as a way of distinguishing between individuals in similar situations is not hard
to understand. An individual is most readily understood to be
47. J. FLOUD & W. YOUNG, supra note 20, at 4-5, 9. "It is a truism
that the selection of certain kinds of conduct as making a man eligible to
be treated as 'dangerous' . . . is essentially a political process." Id. at 9.
The critical role of social judgment has been more generally recognized in
the context of civil commitment. See also State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 26062; 344 A.2d 289, 302 (1975).
48.

W. LOWRANCE, supra note 19.

49. Id. at 75.
50. Id. Courts have had more luck comprehending the scope of the
social policy determinations involved in dealing with the risk from things as
opposed to people. See, e.g., Dalerko v. Heil Co., 681 F.2d 445 (5th Cir.
1982).
51. W. LOWRANCE, supra note 19, at 75.
52. Id. at 76.
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dangerous compared with other persons, and the aim of isolating dangerous criminals makes sense only if we recognize
that there are other criminals who are less dangerous. The
appropriate use of predictions thus requires that before we
attach the label "dangerous" to any person, or criminal, we
must identify the group in reference to which the claim of
dangerousness is made. In part, this determination must be
practical. If the group is made up of individuals identical in
all respects, it is not possible to distinguish between them on
any relevant grounds. On the other hand, comparing all
felons with the general population would be likely to lead to
felons' being identified as a more dangerous group. The need
to establish a category for a meaningful judgment about dangerousness is often intuitively apparent to inmates: when
asked whether there are dangerous criminals, many inmates
laugh, or reply jokingly, "We are all dangerous," while the
answer to the question "Are there some inmates who are
more dangerous then others?" is often precise and certain-the smiles disappear, and the inmates describe which
colleagues they perceive to be more dangerous than others
and why.
As an approach to suggesting how the notion of risk
shifting should be applied, consider the hypothetical case of a
sixteen-year-old black youth who has just dropped out of
school and who has no employment, whose mother was herself a child on welfare when he was born, who does not know
his father, who runs with a street gang, and who lives in a
destroyed inner-city neighborhood. Assume that we can assess the risk of his being involved in the next six months in a
crime of personal violence. Let us give him a base expectancy
rate of violence of one in twenty, to be conservative. That
risk now rests on the community in which he lives. May we,
without further justification, at this one-in-twenty level, shift
that risk from the community and make him bear the cost of
the shift in the coinage of institutional detention until we can
do something to reduce the risk, by retraining him or by allowing time to pass while the threat he presents diminishes?
Clearly not. But let him be involved in a nonviolent crime,
say, shoplifting, and even if that conviction makes no difference to his base expectancy rate of a crime of violence, there
is no doubt that in practice we would then take into account
the risk of a crime of violence in deciding what to do about
him and for what length of time. Within our sentencing discretions, we would take into account the risk of violence he
presents.
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The balance of risk to the community and the restriction
of individual liberty is a policy question to be determined by
the legislature. For example, the legislature may choose, as a
policy decision, to set sentencing standards or ranges which
accommodate the "dangerous" cases. But legislatures cannot
exercise an unlimited freedom in making policy choices about
the use of predictions. 8 If a legislative enactment does not
make clear what levels of dangerousness are acceptable, however, it falls on the courts to determine the balance between
the likelihood of injury-the extent of potential harm-and
the extent of the restriction on individual liberty that is justified in decreasing the risk and related harm.5 '
53. The legislative judgments about the use of predictions of dangerousness pose a substantial threat to a theory such as ours which rests on
the restrictive use of predictions as a guide to the distribution of punishment within ranges defined on other grounds. Our theory places absolute
limits on the use of these predictions by everyone except a legislative body,
although similar reasons should sharply limit legislative reliance on predictions alone to alter the bounds of state power over individuals. We recognize the necessary breadth of legislative powers in a democratic society.
But there are some real constitutional limits to the choices the legislature
may make-both due process and equal protection concerns come immediately to mind as far as the use of predictions is concerned. We urge sensitivity by legislative bodies whenever predictions are used to create new
rules, powers, and controls over the individual. Any exceptional use of predictions, such as pretrial detention, which survives basic constitutional challenge, should require the highest levels of proof and permit restrictions of
individual liberty to the minimum extent possible.
54. That a judge has the power to take individual factors into account in sentencing-including factors presented to the judge that would
violate the "rigid rules of evidence"-is unquestionable under the modern
sentencing theory developed by Justice Black in Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241 (1948). Justice Black observed that "modern concepts individualizing punishment" require access to information not relevant or admissible
in a trial: "The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal
category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life
and habits of a particular offender" and "punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime." Id. at 247.
The doctrine remains vital-see, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 325,
333 (1976)-and has been adopted in many states. E.g. Elson v. State, 659
P.2d 1195 (Alaska 1983); State v. Conn, 137 Ariz. 148, 669 P.2d 581
(1983) (en banc). Justice Black recognized the potential for abuse by judges
with such broad discretion and sources of information. "Leaving a sentencing judge free to avail himself of out-of-court information in making such a
fateful choice of sentences does secure to him a broad discretionary power,
one susceptible of abuse." Williams, 337 U.S. at 251. We believe that the
principled use of predictions of dangerousness would limit possible abuses
by judges in sentencing. Thus, the sentencing judge has the clear power to
operate in a principled fashion regarding predictions of dangerousness,
even in the absence of legislative guidance.
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One final but important point about the morality of using predictions involves the context within which the
problems with statistical predictions must be considered. We
begin with the recognition that we are often going to be
wrong in making predictions. But concern about these errors
ignores the fact that the choice to be made is between using
explicit statistical predictions and using implicit predictions.
The issue is the relative accuracy, not the absolute accuracy,
of the statistical prediction. Looking at the problem in this
light, the evidence indicates that nonstatistical predictions in
bail and sentencing decisions repeatedly produce errors-incorrect predictions-at higher rates than do more
scientific predictions. Forst, citing numerous studies, concluded that "nonstatistical prediction in bail and sentencing
decisions has in fact been found repeatedly to produce errors
at a higher rate than the more scientific approach. '5 5 Gottfredson explained that implicit and untrained judgments show
larger rates of error than statistical predictions, and concluded that statistical devices outperform intuition.5 6 This evidence indicates that the use of statistical predictions of dangerousness in these areas, rather than subjective or intuitive
predictions, would reduce the level of incorrect predictions.
What is true of bail and sentencing decisions may well be true
of the broad range of decisions throughout the criminal justice system which turn on implicit predictions of
dangerousness.
If the use of explicit predictions in sentencing and bail
decisions, based on statistical evidence, reduces the level of
error, then it is unethical to continue the present intuitive
application of discretionary powers. The decision not to use
explicit predictions may pose ethical dilemmas as great or
greater than the decision to use such predictions. If the evidence is correct, it supports an argument-based on greater
individual justice rather than any notion of efficiency-for
There are difficult questions about the evidence that can be used in sentencing raised by the special protections given juvenile offenders and juvenile records. Young males commit a disproportionate number of violent
offenses. Yet if juvenile records are excluded from a prediction of dangerousness, as a sentencing determination, the peak of individual violence may
well have been passed when the utilitarian effects of using the prediction
are applied. These problems are beyond the scope of this essay.
55. Forst, Selective Incapacitation:A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing?, 68 JUDICATURE 153, 157 n.9 (1984).
56. Gottfredson, Statistical and Actuarial Considerationsin THE PREDICTION OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE (1986).
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the cautious and careful use of explicit predictions at least to
guide discretionary decisions.
B.

Racial Bias in Predictions

Because minorities, especially blacks, constitute a disproportionate percentage of defendants and prisoners, any prediction program in criminal justice will affect proportionately
larger numbers of minority individuals than majority individuals. Further, many systems of prediction rely on information-like poor employment records, educational deficiencies, residential instability-that more commonly
characterize minority communities. When such information
is used systematically to distinguish high or low risk groups, it
therefore tends to burden minorities.
The danger and hidden character of implicit predictions
throughout the criminal justice system must again be emphasized. Implicit, intuitive judgments about future behavior
made in exercising discretionary powers are most likely to discriminate against blacks. The explicit use of predictions may,
by setting general standards, limit the current racial patterns
in criminal justice outcomes. It is much easier for bias or
prejudice, unconscious or otherwise, to enter into a discretionary process when there are not neutral, or at least testable, principles to guide the decision. Therefore, we see predictions of dangerousness, used as a guide to discretion, as a
tool which is likely to reduce the impact of racial bias.
It is important to consider the evidence on whether the
disproportionate numbers of blacks in the criminal justice
system are the product of bias. Research indicates that there
is little or no difference in terms of the likelihood that convicted criminals of different races will commit future
crimes.5 7 Other studies indicate that the disproportion between the races in the number of persons arrested mostly results from differences in rates of involvement in crime.58 In
other words, blacks and whites convicted of index crimes are
nearly equally likely to be imprisoned and, later, to be
rearrested.
Consequently, significant disparity in decisionmaking, on
a racial basis, is not likely to result from the explicit use of
predictions of dangerousness after conviction-for example
57.

See, e.g., J.

TICE SYSTEM

PETERSILIA, RACIAL DISPARITES IN THE CRIMINAL JUS-

(1983).

58. See, e.g., Blumstein & Graddy, Prevalence and Recidivism in Index
Arrests: A Feedback Model, 16 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 265 (1981/82).
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at sentencing or in prison administration or early release. In
other words, to the extent that employment of statistical predictions of dangerousness results in discrimination against minorities, this discrimination is not the result of using statistical predictions but of existing bias in the system. Finally, to
the extent that unequal impacts are suffered by different racial groups, it is better that the problem be faced head on.
The issue of predictions should not be used to hide from the
fact that racial disparities remain in the criminal justice
system.

IV.

DANGEROUSNESS:

EVIDENCE AND PROOF

The greatest bar to a sensitive judicial consideration of
the appropriate role of dangerousness at various stages in the
criminal and mental health law has been the confusion between standards of proof required to find criminal guilt (or to
identify those subject to the state's powers under the mental
health law), and the level of confidence required for the
proper use of predictions of dangerousness. This confusion
has been entrenched by the Supreme Court. Evidentiary
problems concerning the proper role of psychologists in predicting dangerousness stem from this basic error. We will examine judicial consideration of the concept of dangerousness
in the criminal law in recent Supreme Court cases."
In Addington v. Texas, ° the Supreme Court held, without
dissent, that in a civil commitment hearing, the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires a standard of
proof, on the issues of the patient's mental illness and of his
danger to himself or to others, equal to or greater than
"clear and convincing" evidence. The Court recognized the
difficulty of quantifying, even of clearly stating, the differences among the usual three standards of proof-balance of
probabilities, beyond reasonable doubt, and an intermediate
standard of clear and convincing evidence-but saw the distinctions as "more than an empty semantic exercise." 6' 1 The
59. The concept of dangerousness in the criminal law is a relatively
recent addition to Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Court has considered the use of predictions of dangerousness in only twenty cases, ten in
the past three years, and never before 1972. Of all of these cases, civil and
criminal, only seven involved extended discussions of dangerousness.
60. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
61. Id. at 425 (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166
(4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert.
dismissed sub nom., Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355
(1972)).
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court saw the distinct levels of proof as an expression of "the
degree of confidence our society thinks [the fact finder]
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication. "62
One of the reasons the Court was satisfied by the "clear
and convincing" standard in an issue involving deprivation of
individual liberty, rejecting the need, as a constitutional matter, for proof beyond reasonable doubt,63 was that "[gfiven
the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis there
is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely
to be dangerous."4 In explaining this statement, Chief Justice
Burger noted that "[t]he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric
diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach in most
situations." 65 The end result of requiring the highest standard of proof for findings of dangerousness, in Chief Justice
Burger's view, would be that jurors and judges "could be
forced by the criminal law standard of proof to reject commitment for many patients desperately in need of institutionalized psychiatric care."66
The Court must be wrong. The decision in Addington
may well be supported by other considerations, but it is not
justified by the impossibility of proving risk beyond a reasonable doubt. That an individual is likely to be dangerous can
be proved at any level required, provided "likely to be dangerous" is given careful construction. If that phrase is defined as "belonging to a group with a risk of dangerous behavior unacceptable in relation to its gravity, if the harm
occurs, balanced against the reduction of individual freedom
involved in its avoidance," then the existence of the likelihood of injury can be proved at the same level as many other
facts. It is a fact in the same sense that a broken bone is a
fact. By contrast, if the phrase "likely to be dangerous" is
62. Id. at 423 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
63. Many state civil commitment statutes continue to require proof
beyond reasonable doubt in this context. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 431 n.5 (fourteen states requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt
when Addington was decided in 1979).
64. Id. at 429 (emphasis added). As we noted earlier, the language
of predictions can be very awkward. Here, the Court writes of an individual who is "likely to be dangerous," yet "dangerous" itself means likely to
be violent or do something harmful in the future.
65. Id. at 430.
66. Id.
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defined as requiring proof on a balance of probability that
this patient will injure himself or others, or that he is more
likely to do so than not, then it cannot be proved at any level
of confidence, since it is very rarely so. In the latter perspective, in practice, it can never be proved, since at present our
best predictive capacities fall far below the requisite level of
proof.
The confusion lies in the admixture of ideas about the
probability of future events and the degrees of confidence in
facts required by the usual three standards of proof. The existence of dangerousness is not a question of the weight of
the burden of proof to be placed on the affirmant of a risk,
and it is a mistake to decide the balance between the risk to
the community and the restrictions on the individual in terms
of the burden of proof. As we have stressed in identifying the
elements that lead to a justified use of predictions of dangerousness, the determination of acceptable and unacceptable
levels of risk is an entirely distinct policy question to be decided by a legislature or deduced by. a judge interpreting a
statute that vests sentencing discretion in the judge; the answer is not capable of expression solely as a problem of evidence. Once the risk is defined, the elements that go to prove
the existence of that risk can be made subject to different
burdens of proof, but not the risk itself.67
In one sense-a sense not encompassed within the
Court's decision in Addington-a requirement of clear and
convincing evidence of "dangerousness," or even of proof
beyond reasonable doubt of "dangerousness," is achievable
and may be appropriate. Assume that a one-in-three base rate
sufficiently defines that condition; proof that the disturbed
patient belongs to that group-has the attributes that define
his membership-may be required under whatever burden of
proof policy dictates. Proof that he is correctly classified is
clearly distinguishable from proof that he, as an individual,
67. We reject on logical grounds any tie between standard of proof
and the level of prediction necessary to justify preventive detention or any
lesser intrusion on the individual's liberty. We do not deny that standards
of proof have a role in applying predictions of dangerousness: that role,
which can be satisfied at whatever level of proof is desired, is to insure the
correct categorization of the individual. The confusion of the standard of
proof with levels of prediction has been the greatest barrier to a sensitive
consideration of the jurisprudence of dangerousness in American courts. It
is not only the courts, but social scientists as well who have made this error.
See Monahan & Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proofand Probability in Civil Commitment, 2 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 37 (1978).
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will injure himself or others; that he has a base expectancy
rate of one in three and not of one in ten is susceptible of
precise proof.
Assume, following Addington, that the risk of serious injury to another person, if the patient is not civilly committed,
is one in three. Does Addington's constitutional requirement
of clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness preclude
the civil commitment of this patient? Clearly not. If it did,
few indeed could be constitutionally committed. What Addington should be read to require is a larger degree of confidence than a preponderance of the evidence by the trier of
facts, judge or jury, of the definition of the group. This
higher degree of confidence would apply as well to proof of
the base expectancy rate of violence for the group, which one
hopes has been validly assessed and shown to be relatively stable, and to proof that this patient indeed falls within that
group.
For the use of predictions of dangerousness in the criminal as opposed to mental health law, the problem is identical.
Thus the elements of "dangerousness" capable of proof in
the case of the hypothetical young offender, posed earlier, include not only his personal circumstances-the historical
facts of his mother and his absent father, his truancy, his
school and employment records, and his gang membership-but also his base expectancy rate of violence. The scientific work necessary to define a group and to assess its base
expectancy rate of criminal violence within a given period
has or has not been done, or has only been partially done. Its
stability over time and in different regions has been tested,
partially tested, or not tested. 8 If the facts of the future
68. This essay sets out our conception of an ideal-the requirements for the proper use of predictions of dangerousness-which we acknowledge cannot presently be attained. We leave for another time the extended development of a "practical" jurisprudence of dangerousness; see
Section V below for interim "practical" suggestions. Courts faced with inadequate, imperfect, or incomplete evidence will have to decide whether to
consider the evidence and what weight that evidence-whether from actuarial studies or clinical predictions-should be given. This problem will become more complex before it becomes less so, as new initial actuarial studies of relevant groups become available. Perhaps courts should recognize
"good enough" science, for those times (almost always) when "perfect" science does not exist. Recognizing and utilizing good enough science would
properly reward efforts at producing perfect science. It would'also reward
the principled use of predictions of dangerousness; judges could take the
imperfections in the available studies and predictions into account when
using such predictions.
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criminal behavior of the group to which our hypothetical offender is said to belong have been found actuarially, then the
question of his risk to the community is not properly related
to the different burdens of proof of those actuarial facts.
Proof of the base expectancy rate is not inherently more difficult than proof of the historical facts on which the rate was
calculated. It makes little difference whether the burden of
their proof is on a balance of probabilities, or by clear and
convincing evidence, or beyond reasonable doubt. It is a mistake to confuse the sufficiency of proof of dangerousness with
a decision whether to require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, or by clear and convincing evidence, or on a balance
of probability. The decision by the Supreme Court in Addington has entrenched this error and has impeded rational
analysis.
Addington figured prominently in the recent case of Jones
v. United States." The defendant, Michael Jones, had pleaded
not guilty by reason of insanity to attempted petty larceny.
The issue in the case was the constitutionality of committing
Jones on grounds of future dangerousness to a term that
might continue beyond the possible sentence for which he
could have been held as a prisoner or for which he could
have been held as a patient on grounds applicable to civil
commitment.
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, found a continuing
presumption both of mental illness and of dangerousness
based on the commission of the criminal act for which Jones
had pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. The expiration
of the "hypothetical" maximum sentence, had Jones been
convicted of the criminal act in question, was held to be irrelevant. Regarding mental illness, Justice Powell wrote that
"[i]t comports with common sense to conclude that someone
whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit a
criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treat70
ment."1
As far as Jones' continued dangerousness, Justice

Powell wrote that "[t]he fact that a person has been found,
beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act
certainly indicates dangerousness.""' Thus, the Court held
69.

463 U.S. 354 (1983).

70.

Id. at 366.
Id. at 364. One must wonder if there is any limit on the extent

71.

of this presumption of dangerousness other than the possibility that, at
some point in his indefinite commitment, Jones may be able to prove that
he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous.
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that Jones could be detained even without finding by clear
and convincing evidence that he remained dangerous and
mentally ill. His dangerousness was presumed on the basis of
the earlier plea.
The presumptions of continuing mental illness and dangerousness were found by the majority even though Jones
had committed an offense that, in "common sense" terms,
was nonviolent.7 2 The Court suggested a definition of dangerousness that would remove all sense from the term; when
attempted petty larceny of a jacket is included as a "dangerous" act, the type and extent of predicted harm justifying the
use of predictions of dangerousness grows enormous. The
willingness of the majority to presume dangerousness on the
basis of the plea of insanity, especially in the absence of any
supporting evidence of the defendant's continued dangerousness, is groundless-in short, Jones is a miscarriage of
73

justice.

Confusion about dangerousness is also evident in the
opinion of the Court in Barefoot v. Estelle.7 4 In Barefoot, psychiatric testimony of dangerousness was admitted under the
Texas death penalty statute, which allows capital punishment
under a finding that "there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society."'7

5

The decision by the

same five-member majority as in Jones was delivered by Justice White, who began by stating that "[t]he suggestion that
no psychiatrist's testimony may be presented with respect to a
defendant's future dangerousness is somewhat like asking us
to disinvent the wheel." 7 6 The Court then expressly approved Justice Stevens' statement in Jurek that "[a]ny sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's probable
future conduct when it engages in the process of determining
72. Jones' criminal act carrying this powerful and continuing diagnostic consequence for five Justices of the Supreme Court was attempted
petty larceny of a jacket.

73. See Monahan & Steadman, Crime and Mental Disorder:An Epidemiological Approach, in 4 CRIME & JUST. 145 (1983); MENTALLY DISORDERED
OFFENDERS (1983). The same paradox noted earlier holds: the Court seems
more willing to find or assume dangerousness when mental illness is involved, without further analysis, even though the civil committee or, here,
the defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, is in theory less
culpable than those convicted of violating the criminal law.
74. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
75. Id. at 884 n.1 (citing TEX. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b)(2)
(Vernon 1981)).
76. Id. at 896.
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what punishment to impose." '7
The Court confused the question of whether predictions
of dangerousness should be allowed at all with the entirely
separate issue of what evidence of prediction-in other
words, what types of predictions-should be admissible in evidence. Having recognized that predictions of dangerousness
cannot be removed from the criminal law, the Court then
seemed to assume that the testimony of psychiatrists regarding the defendant's dangerousness could not be excluded on
any constitutional grounds, no matter how unfounded or
prejudicial the specific testimony in any given case.78

Justice Blackmun, in dissent, correctly found the testimony of the Barefoot psychiatrists so prejudicial and overpersuasive that such evidence should not have been admitted.
One psychiatrist for the State, Dr. Grigson, testified that he
could "give a medical opinion within reasonable psychiatric certainty as to the psychological or psychiatric makeup of an individual. '7 9 Dr. Grigson thought he could predict that Barefoot "most certainly would" commit future acts of criminal
violence, and claimed that the degree of probability that
Barefoot would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society was "one hundred percent and absolute."80 Dr. Holbrook, without the benefit of a
personal interview or clinical examination of Barefoot, testified that it was "within [his] capacity as a doctor of psychiatry to
predict the future dangerousness of an individual within a
reasonable medical certainty," and that "within reasonable psychiatric certainty" there was "a probability that . . . Thomas
A. Barefoot . . . will commit criminal acts of violence in the
future that would constitute a continuing threat to society." ' 1
77. Id. at 897 (quoting from Jurek, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976)).
78. Of course, there may be eighth amendment or fourteenth
amendment due process objections to the admission of such highly prejudicial "expert" testimony regarding such a -serious determination. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916, 923-25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The constitutional
limits on federal review of state statutes and testimony given under state
statutes may have raised a smaller constitutional hurdle than would a federal statute, but we do not see how the testimony actually given by Grigson
and Holbrook in Barefoot, at least, could get over even the most deferential
constitutional hurdle.
79. Id. at 918.
80. Id. at 919 (emphasis in original).
81. Id. at 919, 920 (emphasis in original). The record indicates that
Barefoot did not fit into the category of people so exceptional as to overcome our principles of the just use of predictions of dangerousness. Barefoot had not previously been convicted of a violent offense, but had been
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Such statements, impossible of proof and rejected by the
American Psychiatric Association, s2 rely for their probative
force on the title attached to the witnesses.8 3
In California v. Ramos,"' the majority incorrectly analogized predictions of dangerousness, such as those upheld in
Jurek v. Texass" and Barefoot, to California's "Briggs instruction," which requires that the trial judge in a death case inform the jury that a sentence of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole may be commuted by the governor to
a sentence that includes the possibility of parole. 6
convicted of drug offenses and possession of an unregistered firearm. The
conviction leading to the capital sentence was for the killing of a police
officer. Barefoot was executed in late 1984. The issue whether predictions
of dangerousness could be made based on a hypothetical case, without benefit of any actual clinical probing, is spurious. Clinical predictions of dangerousness naturally lose much of their probative force without personal
examination, since the psychiatrist should be making a judgment based on
all he or she knows or has observed about the individual. In our view,
clinical predictions should never be used in the criminal law when stakes
are this high because they are inherently suspect and untestable. On the
other hand, an actuarial prediction could be made based on a hypothetical
case in which all of the relevant elements had been proven at whatever
level of proof is required.
82. The Barefoot brief for the American Psychiatric Association as
amicus curiae concluded that:
The forecast of future violent conduct on the part of a defendant
in a capital case is, at bottom, a lay determination, not an expert
psychiatric determination. To the extent such predictions have
any validity, they can only be made on the basis of essentially actuarial data to which psychiatrists, qua psychiatrists, can bring no
special interpretive skills. On the other hand, the use of psychiatric testimony on this issue causes serious prejudice to the defendant. By dressing up the actuarial data with an "expert" opinion,
the psychiatrist's testimony is likely to receive undue weight. In
addition, it permits the jury to avoid the difficult actuarial questions by seeking refuge in a medical diagnosis that provides a false
aura of certainty. For these reasons, psychiatric testimony of future dangerousness impermissibly distorts the factfinding process
in capital cases.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Psychiatric Association at 9, Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
83. Restraints on such testimony by members of the psychiatric and
psychological professions have been suggested as well. See, e.g., Ewing, "Dr.
Death" and the Case for an Ethical Ban on Psychiatric and Psychological Predictions of Dangerousnessin Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 8 AM. J. CRIMINOLOGY
& MED. 407 (1983).

84.
85.

463 U.S. 992 (1983).
428 U.S. 262 (1976).

86. The Court observed that:
The Briggs Instruction invites the jury to assess whether the de-
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Ramos concerned the prediction of the future governor's
behavior rather than the prediction of the offender's future
behavior. A commutation of a sentence by a governor would
be a near-random event based wholly on individual factors
which are essentially unpredictable (e.g., new evidence showing that the defendant is innocent; or a highly public response to a trial; or as an act of random but no doubt carefully chosen clemency, as a sign of forgiveness and
compassion on the part of the executive). In other words, the
probability of such an occurrence is so near to zero and the
factors so unrelated to any prediction of group behavior that
the majority's analogy to predictions of dangerousness is indeed an "intellectual sleight of hand. '87 The majority
seemed to think that dangerousness could be evaluated by
the trier on an intuitive, unstructured, and individualized basis, as shown by the misleading reference to "lay"
testimony."
Thus, the Court has not carefully considered the meaning of predictions of dangerousness. Such consideration has
been avoided because of the confusion with burdens of proof
so evident in Addington, obscured by groundless presumptions
in Jones, and ignored by the majority in Barefoot, in which admittedly meaningless and overpersuasive accusations of fufendant is someone whose probable future behavior makes it undesirable that he be permitted to return to society. Like [the use
of predictions of dangerousness in Jurek and Barefoot] the Briggs
Instruction focuses the jury on the defendant's probable future
dangerousness. The approval in Jurek of explicit consideration of
this factor in the capital sentencing decision defeats [the] contention that, because of the speculativeness involved, the State of California may not constitutionally permit consideration of
commutation.
Ramos, 463 U.S. at 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3454 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 103 S.Ct. at 3467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). On remand
from the Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court held the Briggs
instruction unconstitutional under the California constitution "because it is
seriously and prejudicially misleading and because it invites the jury to be
influenced by speculative and improper considerations." People v. Ramos,
37 Cal.3d 136, 153, 689 P.2d 430, 439-40, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 809-10
(1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2367 (1985). Ramos suggests the important
and independent role the state courts can play in developing a jurisprudence of dangerousness.
88. Justice Blackmun appears to be correct on the use of the term
"lay" testimony inJurek and Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472-73 (1981).
See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 936-38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It does not
mean testimony by persons off the street, but testimony by social scientists
armed with statistical predictions.
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ture dangerousness by psychiatrists were allowed to justify
the imposition of capital punishment where a finding of likely
future dangerousness was required by statute.8 9
V.

THE PROPER USE OF PREDICTIONS

In this part, we offer three principles for the just invocation of predictions of dangerousness under the criminal law.
We assume, for this purpose, validly established, base expectancy rates of dangerousness for defined groups of offenders,
though we recognize that such an assumption tends to exaggerate present knowledge. We shall present our three principles, state what we mean by them, and then offer some examples of how they might be applied, with justice, in various
areas of the criminal law.
Our first submission concerning the proper use of predictions of dangerousness under the aegis of the criminal
law-as distinct from the mental health law or immigration
law or the law relating to quarantine or to spies-is this:
Punishment should not be imposed, nor the term of punishment extended, by virtue of a prediction of dangerousness,
beyond that which would be justified as a deserved punishment independently of that prediction.
It will be noted that this submission speaks both to the
assumption of predictive power and to the limitation of that
power. Floud and Young, in their book on this subject, fail to
make this helpful distinction. They consider, as our first principle does, the initial point at which such predictions can
justly be made, though they lapse into overstatement, but
they do not carefully isolate the proper limitations on the application of such predictions thereafter. They write of the
"dangerousness of dangerousness" and are perceptive of the
risk of a "slippery slope" to "universal preventive confinement," where predictive judgments would be used to incapacitate individuals predicted to be dangerous whether or not
89. That the statute in Texas may have indicated unrealistic assumptions by the legislature about the present ability to predict future dangerousness, and thus may have suggested to the psychiatrists that they testify in the terms they did, does not absolve the error in placing such
testimony before a jury. The legislature may have demanded an impossible
finding (in trying to satisfy the current constitutional doctrine regarding
the death penalty) in which case our analysis would not apply, but we later
suggest a possible interpretation of the Texas statute which would give it a
sensible and operational meaning.

432
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they had committed an offense. 90 They argue that a "right to
be presumed harmless . . ., like the right to be presumed innocent, is fundamental to a free society."9' 1 The rhetoric is
overblown, but the point has merit, as does their conclusion
that a "man must justly forfeit his right to be presumed innocent before his right to be presumed harmless can be
brought into question."9' 2
We would agree with this conclusion, but with this important qualification. Powers under the criminal law are
sometimes properly and necessarily exercised prior to findings of guilt by a judicial authority-powers of arrest, of bail,
of search and seizure, and so on.9" We agree with the thrust
of the point made by Floud and Young but would modify it
to this extent: a prediction of dangerousness can never alone
justify the invocation of authority over the individual under
the criminal law that would not exist without such a
prediction."
Our first principle recognizes the distinction between
"customary" and "extraordinary" uses of predictions of dangerousness. Customary uses are those falling within authority
previously recognized. In these cases, the limitation on personal liberty is justified without reference to predictions of
dangerousness. Predictions are used only to distribute punishment. Extraordinary uses are those which rely on predictions
of dangerousness to justify a restriction on liberty-such as a
sentence beyond what a judge could otherwise order, or the
capital sentence allowed in Barefoot. Our first principle allows
only customary uses. 95
90.

91.
92.

J. FLOUD &
Id. at 44.

W. YOUNG, supra note 20, at 40.

Id. at 46.

93. The reality and necessity of predictions as appropriate guides to
the exercise of discretion is most obvious in these circumstances. In deciding whether to arrest in a situation of matrimonial dispute, the police officer would be failing in his duty were he not to take into account his best
estimate of the risk of injury to the wife if he does not make an arrest; in
deciding whether to indict, and for what, the prosecutor will and should
consider the danger to others if he does not go forward with a charge.
94. Floud and Young would even further confine the application of
predictions of dangerousness, which they suggest should not be applied to
first offenders. Again, we have to broaden the base. A sensitive means of
distinguishing between first offenders (especially those convicted of serious
crimes) who present a high risk of future serious criminality and those who
do not is of great practical importance if it can be done within proper ethical limits.
95. In fact, the line between customary and exceptional uses is not
always clear. Newly established programs invoking new state powers and
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Our second submission is:
Provided the previous limitation is respected, predictions of
dangerousness may properly influence sentencing decisions
and other decisions under the criminal law.
The first submission prevents utilitarian values from justifying the exercise of state authority over individuals merely
because of a prediction, here assumed to be valid and stable,
of their membership in a group with a high risk of future
dangerousness. To this extent, the first submission is deontological, expressing adherence to values enshrined in the criminal law that seek to strike a just balance between individual
autonomy and state authority.
The second submission moves into the utilitarian. It suggests that, if there are otherwise existing justifications for the
exercise of state authority over the individual, it is entirely
proper to take into account his membership in such a group.
And this leads to the third and limiting principle, which defines the jurisprudence we offer in this field-that of the
"limiting retributivist."
The third principle is:
The base expectancy rate of violence for the criminal predicted as dangerous must be shown by reliable evidence to
be substantially higher than the base expectancy rate of another criminal with a closely similar criminal record and
with a conviction of a closely similar crime but not predicted as unusually dangerous, before the greater dangerousness of the former may be relied on to intensify or extended his punishment.
Base expectancy rates for appropriately targeted groups
provide the analytical key to policy decisions about the uses
of predictions in various contexts. Only by comparing the
predictions for individuals within relevant groups to the base
expectancy rate of violence for that group can the decision
be made about whether the use of the prediction is proper in
controlling the individual. Predictions of relative dangerousviolating fundamental principles could, under the definitions offered here,
mistakenly be labelled "customary." A similar mislabelling effect would occur for the new exercise of state power well within the borders of preexisting activities and principles. A recognition of fundamental constitutional
and liberty principles, such as the presumption of innocence in our criminal justice system, and the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process, helps to define the proper scope of customary and exceptional uses of
predictions of dangerousness.

JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 2

ness can be used to identify individuals who are particularly
dangerous or non-dangerous within a given group."
The groups for which predictions of dangerousness
should be used as a tool to distinguish among their members
must be chosen with care. Groups which are too large or
small would make the effort to distinguish among the members meaningless. A choice must be made about which factors
define the base-the like characteristics of the members-and which factors should then be used to distinguish
the members within the group.
In the paradigm context of sentencing, the first variable
necessary to define target groups is the crime for which the
defendant has been convicted. No increase in justice can be
gained from comparing an individual who has committed
murder with another who has committed petty larceny. No
legislature would prescribe the same range of punishments
for both of them, and no judge would place them side by side
in making a sentencing determination.
The second variable defining the appropriate groups is
prior record. The judge often looks to prior record, after the
act, in making the initial sentencing determination. The legislature, in imagining the best and worst cases and setting sentencing range, 7 considers the novice and the career criminal
as a justification for a range of possible punishments. The defining retributive rationale-the retribution instinct-responds differently to widely different records.
It is our general submission that these three principles
enunciate a jurisprudence of predictions of dangerousness
that would achieve both individual justice and better community protection than at present.
Our view depends on the recognition that there is a
range of just punishments for a given offense; that we lack
the moral calipers to say with precision of a given punishment, "That was a just punishment." All we can say, with
precision, is: "As we know our community and its values, that
does not seem an unjust punishment." It therefore seems entirely proper to us, within a range of not unjust punishments,
to take account of different levels of dangerousness of those
96. The relative prediction may be at a low absolute level of accuracy, but it might nonetheless validly distinguish between the overall threat
posed by individuals in the two sub-groups.
97. The legislature's decision may also be characterized as the resolution of arguments between legislators over the harshest and mildest acceptable punishments for each offense.
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to be punished; but the concept of the deserved, or rather
the not undeserved, punishment properly limits the range
within which utilitarian values may operate.
The injustice of a punishment, assuming proper proof of
guilt, is thus defined in part deontologically, in limited retributivist terms and not solely in utilitarian terms. The upper and lower limits of "deserved" punishment set the range
within which utilitarian values, including values of mercy and
human understanding, may properly fix the punishment to
be imposed.
There is no way to prove absolutely that act and prior
record are the essential elements in choosing the target
groups. But these elements are not chosen from thin air. All
modern sentencing commissions to date have considered act
and record to be the key elements in laying out a grid-in
other words, in defining the retributive boundaries for the
sentencing choices." Act and record are also a fair description of what judges consider in sentencing. Finally, we cannot
think of what other principles might be used to identify appropriate target groups. The choice of these factors is a reflection of both practice and common sense.
There is often a range of "not-unjust" punishments,
measured in relation to the gravity of the offense and the offender's criminal record. And when punishment systems fail
to appreciate the need for such a range and set up mandatory
sentences, as occasionally happens, they always get into
trouble. Such systems either are circumvented, or achieve
gross injustice, or both. Punishments and a scale of just punishments should always allow for discretion to be exercised,
under proper legislative guidance, by the judicial officer of
the state. This position recognizes the difference between the
justification for punishment and the distribution of
punishments."
Justifying the application of predictions of dangerousness
to an individual within this range of just punishments also
helps determine the appropriate group in comparison with
which his relative dangerousness should be determined. This
is a group with similar criminal records, who have committed
crimes of similar gravity to that of the offender being sentenced, since universally these are the two leading determinants of what are seen as just punishments. Hence the struc98. See Tonry, Sentencing Commissions and Sentencing Guidelines: The
Second Generation, in SENTENCING REFORM IN ENGLAND (1986).
99. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 42.
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ture of our three principles, allowing room for predictions in
sentencing within the concept of the not unjust sentence, and
using gravity of crime and criminal record to determine the
comparison group against which an offender's higher base
expectancy rate of violence must be established. Once criminal record and severity of the current offense are included,
the definition of groups with higher base expectancy rates
than those with similar crimes and similar criminal records
becomes very much more difficult of proof-but it is a prerequisite to justice in sentencing.
It may help give substance to these submissions to suggest how our theory of just predictions of dangerousness
might operate in various areas of the criminal law of particular present concern. Overall, the principles we offer would
have a dramatically restrictive effect on the acceptability of
predictions of dangerousness in the criminal law, but our
principles would also allow room for the future development
of an enlarged capacity to apply such predictions with justice.
Let us try to give operational perspective to these principles by considering their application in four areas of the
criminal law: first, in relation to sentencing under such systems as that first established in Minnesota, further developed
in Pennsylvania, and now finding increasing acceptance in
other states and also under other systems of sentencing;"'
second, in relation to the problem of early release under
pressure of prison overcrowding; third, in relation to the
problem of release on bail or on the accused's own recognizance; and, finally, in relation to the difficult problem that
confronted the Supreme Court in Barefoot v. Estelle. In none
of these areas will we do more than suggest the basis of a just
invocation of predictions of dangerousness.
A.

Sentencing: Minnesota and Pennsylvania and Other Systems

As we have seen, predictions of dangerousness are in fact
taken into account in sentencing, and the Supreme Court has
expressly approved that practice. Given discretion in sentencing, that result is inevitable. Nevertheless, how should it
properly operate? Let us assume a Minnesota/Pennsylvaniatype sentencing system by which the gravity of the offense
and the convicted person's criminal record define both
100. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, REPORT TO
THE LEGISLATURE (1980); PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (1982); WASHINGTON SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE

(1983).
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whether he should be imprisoned and, if so, the range of
months within which the term should be set. These guidelines bind or, in Pennsylvania, guide the sentencing judge unless he wishes to impose a more lenient or more severe sentence than the guidelines provide (of course within his
statutory powers), in which case he must give reasons for his
"departure" from the guidelines.
Our principles would not justify a "departure" on the
grounds of the offender's predicted dangerousness; they
would justify a judge in setting a sentence at the top of the
range set by the guidelines,1 0 ' provided the criminal being
sentenced had been shown on a valid basis to have a higher
base expectancy rate of dangerousness than other criminals
falling within those same guidelines. Let us put the matter
colloquially for those who are acquainted with the "boxes" of
the Minnesota/Pennsylvania-type sentencing system: the
boxes would both set the limits and define the comparison
group for the extension of punishment on the basis of an offender's predicted greater dangerousness.02
The Minnesota/Pennsylvania system of sentencing narrows the discretion of the judge. How should our principles
operate when the upper limit on the judge's sentencing
power is the maximum provided by statute? Presumably, that
maximum is statutorily intended to apply to the "worst
case-worst record" offender. We are not suggesting, in such
a situation, that predictions of dangerousness justify increments of sentencing up to that maximum. The operating
maximum in such a case must be what the judge would think
not undeserved for such an offender as he has before him,
and with a similar record (those factors would fix his estimate
of the not-undeserved maximum for such an offender, which
would set the upper limit of an increment of sentence on the
basis of dangerousness). The advantage of considering the
application of our principles in a Minnesota/Pennsylvaniatype sentencing system is that such a system gives some operative and ascertainable meaning to the upper limit of desert
in the individual case, which other sentencing systems tend to
conceal.
101. A series of Minnesota cases have made clear that dangerousness
cannot justify a durational departure by a judge on the grounds that the
legislature specifically accounted for future dangerousness in setting the
sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dietz, 344 N.W.2d 386 (Minn.
1984); State v. Ott, 341 N.W.2d 883 (Minn. 1984); State v. Gardner, 328
N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1983).
102. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. at 301 (West Supp. 1986).
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Early Release

Assume a state prison system so crowded that, in response to legislatively approved powers, some prisoners must
be released prior to the termination of their sentences, less
time off for good behavior, and apart from the state's parole
system. This situation has recently occurred in several states,
sometimes under legislative authority, sometimes pursuant to
gubernatorial powers of clemency, and sometimes under
court order.
How are prisoners to be selected for early release?
Should the state release all those with only, say, three months
to serve, or four months, or whatever period will produce the
necessary reduction of population? Early release is never carried out in that way. Invariably, an effort is made to select a
group with a lower rate of likely dangerousness, particularly
for the period during which they will now be at large when
they would otherwise have been in custody. The political
pressures to this end are compelling, and if it be assumed that
the sentences on all were just, then no injustice is caused by
extending this clemency to a few. 10 8 That this involves predictions of dangerousness is obvious, and they are exactly the
predictions of dangerousness that have been used by those
who have developed and applied parole prediction tables for
several decades-efforts to assess actuarially the likelihood
that various categories of prisoners will commit crimes during their parole periods. It will be seen that our three principles apply here.'0
We are not, of course, seeking to justify the parole system or current practices of early release. Rather, if a parole
system, giving some discretion to the releasing authority, is
itself a just system, then predictions of dangerousness, if valid
and based on the comparison groups we have suggested, are
ethically justifiable. And in the case of early release, the categories for the comparison groups and for the selection are
also obvious. Some prisoners convicted of particularly heinous crimes, whose early release would stir public anxiety,
will be excluded, and the remaining and proper comparison
103. But see Matthew 20:1-15; Luke 14:15-24.
104. To the extent that predictions of dangerousness retain less validity at the far end of a prison term, distant from the critical acts which
supported any original prediction, given the problems of fairness in distributing early release among otherwise noncomparable inmates, and given the
paucity of data, the release decision really becomes, and should be recognized as, a wholly political decision.
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group will be those with a defined time to serve. Within that
group, base expectancy rates of dangerousness may justly be
considered.
C.

Bail and Release

Let us pursue another example, one that both severely
tests our principles and reveals their potential for application
outside the area of sentencing on which we have concentrated. The questions of bail or release on the accused's own
recognizance, of appearance for trial and of crimes committed during such release, are of great public concern and have
generated various proposals for preventive detention prior to
trial. Such proposals all involve, in one way or another, efforts to predict those either less likely to appear for trial or
more likely to commit a crime if left at large pending trial.
We wish to avoid becoming involved in the heated constitutional and policy conflicts attending those bail reform
proposals; they are serious issues, but our concern is narrower. If release on bail is to be denied to those having a
higher base expectancy rate of not appearing or of committing a crime prior to trial, what are the limiting principles,
akin to the concept of a deserved punishment, that can set
bounds to the imposition of these disadvantages on our unknown arrested "false positives?"
None of the arrested but untried deserve punishment in
the same sense that the convicted offender being sentenced,
or the sentenced offender being considered for early release,
have a deserved, applicable maximum sanction. Can "probable cause" for the arrest substitute for a "deserved maximum
punishment" as a limiting principle? It would seem not. No
punishment is "deserved" by the arrested person, whether or
not there is probable cause for the arrest. But the analogy is
close in this sense: predictions of dangerousness properly
function only within discretions otherwise lawfully justified.
Current bail reform proposals are restrictive of liberty,
but let us start with the converse case to explain this point.
Consider a bail reform proposal that suggested that release
pending trial of those charged with capital crimes should
cease to be governed by an unfettered judicial discretion, but
should be made subject to defined prediction processes by
which only those accused of capital crimes, and with a stated
high base expectancy rate of flight, should be detained, the
predictive criteria being stated. None would, we suggest, object on grounds of civil liberty that the "false positives" with
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high base expectancy rates would, as a consequence, not be at
large pending trial while others accused of capital crimes
would be free on bail. The point is that the detention of all is
justified on grounds other than their predicted dangerousness and is not constitutionally objectionable; hence, neither
is the detention of a few, provided the base expectancy rates
are validly established and proved. Here the greater does include the lesser.
Now consider the reverse and more likely "reform." Bail
may be denied to those who, for example, have previously
jumped bail or committed a crime while on bail, or are
charged with a crime of serious personal violence and had
previously been convicted of such a crime, or have a record
of drug abuse. If it is legislatively accepted and passes constitutional muster, no matter what its wisdom as social policy, it
seems to us that it is entirely proper to apply here exactly the
same principles for exercising discretion based on predictions
of dangerousness as in the sentencing situation, the early release situation, or other areas of the criminal law where powers are lawfully taken over defined groups of citizens, the exercise of those powers being modulated by predictions of
dangerousness.
By contrast, and to drive home the point, we would regard as wholly unprincipled a bail "reform" statute which
provided that arrested persons with a base expectancy rate
of, say, one in three of not appearing for trial or one in four
of committing a crime of a certain gravity while at large
pending trial, may be denied bail. What it comes to is that
the legislature must, within its constitutional powers, address
the reality of false positives for the group; that difficult balance cannot be left to the judge in the individual case.
As conviction of a crime is the nonutilitarian justification
for the application of the prediction of dangerousness in sentencing, so the existence of probable cause for an arrest and
of legislative authority to deny bail-or to set it beyond the
reach of the arrested person-are the preconditions for consideration of the likely dangerousness of the arrested person
in this situation. Who will then form the comparison group
against which one arrested person's higher base expectancy
rate of dangerousness justifies his detention? Other persons
arrested for a crime of similar gravity and with similar
records.
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D. Barefoot v. Estelle
As our fourth example of how the principles we offer in
this essay would properly limit, and yet allow room for reliance on, predictions of dangerousness, let us build on the
case of Barefoot v. Estelle, in which the testimony of two psychiatrists was, in our view, improperly allowed to go to the
jury on the prisoner's future dangerousness and therefore fitness for capital punishment. Barefoot provides a paradigm for
the application of our offered principles.
The Texas psychiatrists testified as expert witnesses that
the murderer, Barefoot, was a sociopath (a meaningless
though profoundly pejorative diagnosis) and that he was
highly likely to be a danger to the community if released and
to other prisoners if detained. The applicable Texas statute
authorized Barefoot's execution if "there is a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society."1 °5
If our principles are correct, the two psychiatrists should
have been asked something like the following: If Barefoot's
murder is compared with murders of similar gravity by men
with a similar record to Barefoot's, does the fact that you diagnose him as a sociopath mean, when added to the other
diagnostic information you have about him, that he has a
higher likelihood than those other similar murderers with
similar records of being injurious to others if not executed?
The point is not that Barefoot has a high likelihood of injuring others in the future-we will assume that. What we have
to know is whether he has a higher likelihood than those with
whom we are comparing him. Otherwise we must execute
them all or not execute Barefoot. He must be distinguished
validly from them by his greater dangerousness if we are with
justice to select him for his greater punishment. We must
have a comparison group against whom to establish his
greater dangerousness. Who should constitute that comparison group? They must be murderers of similar record, whose
killings were of similar gravity, whom you do not call sociopaths and do not otherwise selectively diagnose. Very well,
doctors, give us the evidence on which you based this diagnostic category "sociopath" and found that this sociopath,
Barefoot, has a higher base expectancy rate than those
105. It is not our purpose to defend such a statute-far from it.
Rather, our purpose is to suggest how predictions of dangerousness can be
applied, with justice, within such a statute, reluctantly, for the moment,
assuming its ethical validity.
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others.
Of course, there is no such evidence. But that, we submit, is the proper thrust of the inquiry. Only with such evidence could one defend a selection under which one might,
with justice, increase a punishment by virtue of a prediction
of future violent behavior-and not otherwise.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

Our essay is somewhat utopian. We started by recognizing the pervasive use of predictions of dangerousness, implicit and explicit, in the criminal law. We concluded by
enunciating principles highly restrictive of the use of such
predictions. We are well aware that it is our principles and
not practice that will fall in this conflict.
That we are often compelled to make predictions leading
to the extension of punishment, or to leniency, though
guided by inadequate information-that our prediction capabilities are poor-is a regrettable truth."" Many important
decisions have to be taken on the basis of inadequate knowledge, and such is the case with predictions of dangerousness
in the application of both criminal and mental health law.
This does not mean that we withdraw our submissions;
rather, we recognize that the path to a responsible jurisprudence of prediction under the criminal law is neither short
nor likely to be of easy passage. For the time being, judgments must be made (1) in light of these principles; (2) in
light of available studies and evidence identifying both positive and negative predictive factors; (3) in open recognition
of generally limited predictive abilities; and (4) with the realization that intuition is often wrong. Finally, (5) the term
"dangerousness" must be more carefully used. The type of
predicted harm underlying a prediction of dangerousness
must be kept within some principled limits, and not allowed
to extend to meaningless or open-ended descriptions of
harm.107
106. The cost of research and data collection raises additional
problems. In some cases, the return in increased justice from the desired
application may not be worth the cost of generating sufficiently reliable
and testable data.
107. Dangerousness should not be used as a synonym for recidivism,
vileness in the particular act, general disrespect for law, or a criminal lifestyle. See, e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 705 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1004 (1984) (criminal life-style) (interpreting the federal
Dangerous Special Offender Statute); United States v. Hondo, 575 F.
Supp. 628 (D. Minn. 1983) (general disrespect for law); Sundeberg v.
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The issues surrounding the use of predictions identified
in this essay, such as the concern with the presumption of
innocence, can often be stated in either "legal" or "moral"
terms. More generally, they can be stated as issues of justice.
The central framework for the resolution of these issues rests
on the recognition that the use of statistical predictions must
often be compared with the current use of implicit predictions of future behavior, with all the injustice of decisions
made for hidden reasons, unacceptable reasons, or for no
reason at all. The real world cannot be ignored, and therefore it is wrong to compare the difficulties recognized in the
use of statistical predictions with a hypothetical world of perfect knowledge about human behavior.
The other general point which must be recognized to
face the moral issues is that these issues cannot be resolved by
resort to legal principle or to mere numbers. The initial determination as to when and how predictions should be used is
necessarily a political and moral choice. Only after this choice
has been made can the legal institutions, and limited predictive abilities, be brought into use in any particular situation.
That a prediction is at a high or low level, or that the harm
predicted is severe or minor, are only relevant after the decision has been made as to what likelihood of harm, and what
type of harm, should be used to regulate individual liberty, or
to properly distribute, within limited ranges, the tremendous
punitive powers of the state.
As is so often the case with problems as they arise within
the legal system, procedural and evidentiary aspects emerge
as central in importance to a just use of predictions of dangerousness. We have argued that clinical predictions of dangerousness unsupported by actuarial studies should rarely be
relied on. It is shocking that the Supreme Court relies on
such statements absent validated statistical support. Clinical
judgments firmly grounded on well-established base expectancy rates are a precondition, rarely fulfilled, to the just invocation of predictions of dangerousness as a ground for intensifying punishment. Our theory provides a rational
process for considering the just use of predictions. Unless
these principles or something similar are followed, the present movement toward the overuse of predictions of dangerousness will be a threat to justice.
Alaska, 652 P.2d 113 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (recidivism); Quintana v.
Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127, 295 S.E.2d 643 (1982), reh'g denied, 461
U.S. 940 (1983) (vileness in the act).
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Developing a coherent and practical jurisprudence of
dangerousness will not be an easy task. Difficult issues have
been avoided as courts have hidden behind the wall of standards of proof and behind the white coats of psychiatrists and
psychologists. Yet predictions of dangerousness have been applied implicitly and explicitly by judges and parole boards,
hospital administrators and psychologists, police and correctional officers, victims of crimes and prosecutors of criminals.
Scholarship and legal analyses have failed sufficiently to recognize the danger of this untested and intuitive use of our
poor capacity to predict violent future behavior. While our
criminal justice and mental health systems cannot function
without the concept of dangerousness, people in these systems must always keep in mind that there is a danger both to
individual liberty and to effective crime control in the concept of dangerousness.

